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Abraham and White: Recovering Wagner

RECOVERING WAGNER V. INTERNATIONAL
RAILWAY COMPANY
Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White *
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Cardozo’s 1921 opinion for the Court of Appeals
of New York in Wagner v. International Railway Co. 1 has been
called the “seminal case imposing liability on a tortfeasor for harm
suffered by a person who came to the rescue of another.” 2 The case
is indeed seminal, but it did not become so on its own. Rather, in
Wagner, Cardozo took a question on which there already was
substantial precedent, and re-answered the question in a new,
inimitable, and memorable way. As Cardozo put it in a now-canonical
phrase, “Danger invites rescue.” 3 Then, precisely by virtue of the way
Cardozo did this re-answering, Wagner became the leading decision
on the subject.
In this Article we analyze Cardozo’s accomplishment, and we
show how his opinion in Wagner foreshadowed what he later
accomplished in his even more celebrated opinion in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co. 4 Part I extensively reviews the evidence and jury
instructions at the trial in Wagner. Part II outlines the relevant New
York case law at the time of the appeal. Part III identifies the ways in
which counsel employed and characterized this case law and its
application to the Wagner case on appeal. Finally, Part IV analyzes
Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner, explaining how he approached the

*Each

of the authors is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University
of Virginia School of Law.
1 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM cmt. a (Am.
Law Inst. 2010).
3 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
4 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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rescue issue, how he applied this approach to the facts, and why we
believe that Wagner was a precursor to Palsgraf.
I.

THE FACTS AND THE TRIAL

Arthur Wagner sued the International Railway Company,
which operated trolley cars, for negligence. 5 At trial, there was a jury
verdict for the defendant. 6 Wagner appealed, and the Appellate
Division affirmed. 7 Wagner then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
where Cardozo sat. The case, which produced Cardozo’s “danger
invites rescue” proposition, arose out of a bizarre set of facts which
Cardozo’s opinion severely truncated. Here is Cardozo’s statement of
the facts in Wagner:
The action is for personal injury. The defendant
operates an electric railway between Buffalo and
Niagara Falls. There is a point on its line where an
overhead crossing carries its tracks above those of the
New York Central and the Erie. A gradual incline
upwards over a trestle raises the tracks to a height of
twenty-five feet. A turn is then made to the left at an
angle of from sixty-four to eighty-four degrees. After
making this turn, the line passes over a bridge, which is
about one hundred and fifty-eight feet long from one
abutment to the other. Then comes a turn to the right at
about the same angle down the same kind of an incline
to grade. Above the trestles, the tracks are laid on ties,
unguarded at the ends. There is thus an overhang of the
cars, which is accentuated at curves. On the bridge, a
narrow footpath runs between the tracks, and beyond
the line of overhang there are tie rods and a protecting
rail.
Plaintiff [Arthur Wagner] and his cousin Herbert
[Wagner] boarded a car at a station near the bottom of
one of the trestles. Other passengers, entering at the
same time, filled the platform, and blocked admission
to the aisle. The platform was provided with doors, but
5
6
7

Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437-38.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
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the conductor did not close them. Moving at from six to
eight miles an hour, the car, without slackening, turned
the curve. There was a violent lurch, and Herbert
Wagner was thrown out, near the point where the trestle
changes to a bridge. The cry was raised, “Man
overboard.” The car went along the bridge, and stopped
near the foot of the incline. Night and darkness had
come on. Plaintiff walked along the trestle, a distance
of four hundred and forty-five feet, until he arrived at
the bridge, where he thought to find his cousin’s body.
Several other persons, instead of ascending the trestle,
went beneath it, and discovered under the bridge the
body they were seeking. As they stood there, the
plaintiff’s body struck the ground beneath them.
Reaching the bridge, he had found upon a beam his
cousin’s hat, but nothing else. About him, there was
darkness. He missed his footing, and fell. 8
Scholars have shown that in both his MacPherson and Palsgraf
opinions, Cardozo’s treatment of the facts was artful to the point of
possibly being disingenuous. 9 In contrast, the above statement of the
facts in Wagner contains only one detail that is not fully supported by
the trial record: that there was a “violent lurch” when the electric car
turned the curve as it ascended toward the bridge. 10 Of all the
witnesses who were present when Herbert Wagner fell off the car as it
went around a curve, only one, Herbert himself, testified that just
before he fell off, the car “lurched” and “somebody on the platform
lurched with the car, and knocked up against me and swung me around
and I lost my foothold [and fell].” 11 When the Wagner case was
argued before the Court of Appeals, counsel for Wagner, Hamilton
Ward (later to be the New York Attorney General under Governor
Franklin D. Roosevelt), maintained in his statement of the facts that
[w]hen the car reached the curve to the left on top of the
bridge it turned at such a rapid rate of speed as to cause
8

Id. at 437.
See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS STORIES 41-44, 51 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003); WILLIAM H. MANZ, THE PALSGRAF CASE: COURTS, LAW, AND SOCIETY
IN 1920S NEW YORK ix-xi (2005).
10 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
11 Record on Appeal at 46, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921)
[hereinafter “Record on Appeal”].
9
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the crowd to lurch toward plaintiff and his cousin,
Herbert J. Wagner, throwing the latter off of the car. . . .
The violence of the lurch was caused by the excessive
speed of the car in making the turn. 12
No other witness referred to a “lurch;” some, including Arthur Wagner
himself, describing the car as “swaying” as it went around curves and
the passengers as “swaying” with it. 13
A characterization of the car’s having “violent[ly] lurch[ed]”
was arguably helpful to Cardozo’s framing of the Wagner case,
because it provided evidence that the car may have been driven at too
rapid a rate of speed around a curve, especially since it was crowded,
its back doors were open, and some passengers, unable to find seats
inside, were hanging onto rails on its back platform’s steps. All of
those factors helped Cardozo reach a conclusion that the railroad may
have been negligent toward Herbert Wagner, which was a necessary
step in his conclusion that it may have been negligent toward Herbert’s
rescuer, Arthur, as well. 14
But, for the most part, Cardozo’s bare-bones summary of the
facts in Wagner was accurate. But because the summary was barebones, it has had the effect of depriving audiences of much of the
human interest, and much of the evidence of Cardozo’s creativity, in
the case. There was no opinion delivered by the trial judge in Wagner,
and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York issued
a one-paragraph opinion upholding the jury’s defense verdict in the
case. 15 To flesh out the scenario that resulted in Arthur Wagner’s being
permanently disabled from his fall from the International Railway’s
bridge, we must turn to the trial record, and to the briefs submitted to
the Court of Appeals after Hamilton Ward appealed to that court.
Arthur Wagner was 30 years old, and his cousin, Herbert, was
24, when on August 20, 1916, the two men, who lived across from one
another on Maple Street in Buffalo, New York, embarked on a pleasure
outing to Grand Island on Lake Erie, just south of Niagara Falls and
12 Brief of Appellant at 4, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921)
[hereinafter “Brief of Appellant”].
13 Arthur Wagner testified that “the crowd kind of swayed and . . . I turned around and just
saw the shadow of man go overboard.” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105-06. Another
witness for the plaintiff said that as the car went around a curve “there was a little jar you could
notice,” which counsel for the plaintiff got the witness to rephrase as a “little swaying.” Record
on Appeal, supra note 11, at 79.
14 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
15 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 291-92.
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about ten miles north of Buffalo. 16 Arthur was employed as an
upholsterer, and Herbert was a bricklayer; both men were single. 17
They left Buffalo around 2:30 in the afternoon of August 20, which
was a Sunday, traveling on an electric railway car – a trolley – operated
by the International Railway Company. 18 Single “500”-type cars,
approximately forty feet long and painted yellow, were used by the
company on its Buffalo-Niagara Falls route, which included several
stops and was typically busy with local and tourist passengers. 19
Passenger service on the route appears to have been very frequent on
Sundays in August, because when Herbert and Arthur attempted to
board a car on their return trip, sometime after 8 P.M., at least one car
passed by their station without stopping since it was full. 20
The electric railway route north from Buffalo to Grand Island
had taken them through the towns of Tonawanda and North
Tonawanda. The car had stopped at Payne’s Junction in North
Tonawanda and then proceeded up the trestle, over the bridge, and
down to the Edgewater stop, where the Wagners got off. At the stop
there was a hotel, Fitch’s saloon, and a boat landing where a ferry took
passengers to Grand Island. The Wagners arrived on Grand Island
between 5 and 5:30 P.M. There was a saloon on the island itself, and
Arthur and Herbert had drinks there, Herbert having a bottle and a half
of beer and Arthur two bottles. 21 On the island, the Wagners watched
a ball game, walked around, and sat on the dock. They met a group of
people they knew, composed of both men and women, and remained
there until sometime between 7 and 7:30 P.M., when they took a ferry
back to the Edgewater railway stop on the mainland. 22 While waiting
for the International Railway car, they again had drinks, Herbert
Wagner having “two drinks of beer” and Arthur “two drinks of Alden
water.” 23

16

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 98, 100-01.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 99.
18 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 101.
19 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 49.
20 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 102. Another witness, George William Reppentine,
who was also a passenger on the return trip, said that “I was there at Edgewater waiting for
the car about twenty minutes. There was two cars passed us, and we couldn’t get onto them
on account of the crowd.” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 55.
21 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53.
22 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 52.
23 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53.
17
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By the time they returned to the Edgewater railway station, the
sun had gone down and they found a number of people waiting for a
southbound trolley car toward Buffalo. When one arrived, the car
stopped before the place where they were waiting in the station, and
they went past the front of the car to the back to get on the rear
platform. 24 The people waiting had consisted of both men and women,
and all the women were ushered into the interior of the car. There were
doors closing off the platform from the outside, but they were left open,
and several men -- Herbert Wagner speculated as many as ten -- chose
to stand on the platform, smoking. Herbert had noticed that “the car
wasn’t crowded . . . when we walked past it to get on [the train] . . .
you could see the whole aisle of the car was empty. When we got up
to the car, the ladies all went inside and maybe one or two fellows had
gone in.” 25
When the Wagners eventually reached the steps of the car
leading toward the rear platform, they found that they were the last
people boarding the car. There were a sufficient number of men on the
rear platform to initially prevent them from entering the interior of the
car, so they first stood on the steps, eventually climbing up to the
platform, where they stood near one another on the back edge of the
platform, each holding on to a rail. “We tried to get up further [on to
the platform],” Arthur Wagner testified, but “[t]here were too many
people there.” 26 At that point, with the Wagners both poised between
the edge of the platform and its steps, the conductor of the car gave a
signal to its motorman to start. The conductor testified that he had not
observed the position of the Wagners when he gave the signal, but
subsequently noticed that “there was someone on the step,” and
testified:
I got a couple of people to step off the back platform
into the body of the car, and then I looked out and then
when I see those men on the step I asked them to get up
off the step so they wouldn’t get hit going around the
curve up on top of the trestle. 27

24

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 103-04.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 44-45.
26 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105.
27 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 218-19. One witness for the defendant stated that he
had heard the conductor ask men on the steps of the platform to “come inside,” apparently
meaning into the interior of the car. Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 138. Arthur Wagner
25
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Almost immediately after leaving the Edgewater stop, the car
line entered the trestle and moved upward at a rise of about six percent,
eventually reaching a bridge about twenty-five feet above the tracks of
the Erie Railroad. Before reaching the bridge, the track turned left on
a curve, at an angle of sixty-four to eighty-four degrees. 28 According
to the testimony of several passengers, the car’s passing around the
curve caused it to “sway,” and some passengers who were standing
“swayed” along with it.29 Herbert Wagner, about to join the Army,
was deposed before trial, and his deposition testimony was read into
evidence at the trial. He testified as follows about the moments just
before the car reached the bridge:
Q. When you got upon the platform, the car was going?
A. Half way up the trestle.
Q. And then what happened?
A. The car turned . . . , I stood at the left of my cousin,
was at the back end of the car, and he was at my
right . . . and the car turned, and I was holding on the
car with . . . my left arm, and as the car turned, it
swung; . . . and I went to reach with [my left] arm to
grab ahold of something to steady myself, and as I did
that, somebody on the platform lurched with the car,
and knocked up against me and swung me around and
I lost my foothold and dislocated my shoulder and I
went down under the trestle. 30
Arthur Wagner was not initially aware that his cousin had
fallen from the trolley car. As he put it:
The car started going up the grade, and when it got to
the barn the crowd kind of swayed and [I] heard
somebody . . . holler as though somebody wanted help,
and I . . . turned around and just saw the shadow of a
subsequently testified that the conductor had said nothing to him. Record on Appeal, supra
note 11, at 255.
28 This testimony was by an assistant engineer in the City of Buffalo’s Engineer’s Office.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 17-18.
29 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 40-41, 77-79.
30 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 45-46.
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man go overboard. . . . Then I looked right around to
see who it was, to see where [Herbert] was, and I saw
he was gone. 31
Herbert Wagner had apparently fallen directly off the trestle to the
ground below, a distance of at least 15 feet. The rear of the trolley car
extended beyond the car’s track as the car went around the curve and
there was no barrier beyond the tracks. Therefore, there was nothing
to prevent Herbert’s falling into space. 32 His body landed on or near
the Erie tracks directly under the trestle, where he was subsequently
found, unconscious from the impact of the fall. 33
After realizing that Herbert had fallen off the car, Arthur yelled,
along with another passenger, “Man Overboard,” 34 and when the
conductor heard them he rang a bell, a signal for the motorman of the
car to stop at a “regular stopping place” on the track, near a car barn at
the south end of the trestle. 35 After hearing the bell the motorman
slowed the car, which proceeded approximately 550 feet across the
bridge and down an incline, where it stopped at the foot of the trestle.
At that point the conductor came around to the front of the car and told
the motorman that a man had fallen from the car. The motorman then
“fixed [his] car so it was safe to leave and took [his] lantern and went
[to the] back [end of the car].” 36
At this point the testimony of central figures in the incident
began to diverge. Arthur Wagner testified:
[after] the car slowed down and stopped . . . , I looked
for the conductor and . . . the conductor . . . says, ‘Show
me where he fell,’ and I stepped off the car, I walked up
along the bridge, and the conductor with two or three
other men followed me with a lantern about two or three
feet behind me. 37
The conductor, Leo Beemer, testified, however, that after he
heard the cry of man overboard, “I gave the motorman a bell,”
instructing him to “stop at the regular stopping place at the bottom of
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105-06.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 28-29.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 91, 174.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 107.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 219.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 177.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 107.
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the trestle.” 38 Beemer then, he said, “went around [to the front of the
car] and told the motorman that someone had fallen off the car on the
trestle,” and then “left him and . . . went back into the car barns
to get a lantern from the watchman there.” 39 Once he had the lantern,
Beemer said, “I saw this other car coming over the top of the trestle,”
and “when I [saw] him coming . . . I took the lantern and flagged him
. . . on account of our car standing at the bottom of the incline . . . so
that I would take no chance of him running into the back of our car.” 40
After telling the motorman of the second car that a man had fallen off
the trestle, and that the first car had stopped so that a search for him
could be conducted, Beemer said that he “started down the side of the
dirt down between the street car barns and the trestle.” 41 Asked
whether anyone went with him, Beemer replied, “I was alone as far as
I can remember.” 42 Beemer made no mention of meeting Arthur
Wagner, or having any conversation with him.
In contrast, Wagner testified that he and Beemer had walked
“straight back” from the back of the car, on railroad ties, and that
Beemer had a lantern. “We went up to the top of the trestle,” Wagner
said, and “we found somebody that said ‘Here is his hat,’ and picked
it up and then showed it to me and I identified it.” 43 Wagner then
recalled that he “started to walk forward again,” and testified:
I suddenly discovered I was in the dark, . . . and then I
turned around and I saw no light, . . . and waited then,
perhaps thought I could see a light somewhere, and
I waited another minute . . . until I saw a light way
down below underneath . . . down below the trestle
somewheres in front of me. 44
At that point, Wagner continued, “I hollered, and I took a few steps to
go down [back to the car]. . . . I took a few steps and I fell through,”
landing “on the ground below the trestle.” He dropped his cousin’s hat
as he fell, and had not seen it since. 45

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 219.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 220.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 222.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 222-23.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 108.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 108-09.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 109-10.
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Beemer, however, said that when he arrived beneath the trestle,
“I walked right on up as far as I could” to find “the motorman . . . with
his lantern.” 46 He had just found the motorman, he recalled, when
“some little girl said ‘Here’s the man,’ and I walked over to where he
was then and the motorman was there too.” 47 Beemer then “went back
to telephone the doctor, or the ambulance, at Payne’s Avenue
[Junction].”48
Asked “when you got off the car there at the rear end, did you
say to anybody, ‘Show me where he fell,’?” Beemer said “No, I
didn’t.” Asked “Did you at any time ask anybody to go up on the
trestle?” Beemer said, “No, I didn’t.” Asked “Did you yourself go up
on the trestle?” Beemer said “No, I didn’t go up on the trestle.” 49 He
added that he had not flagged the second car down until it had passed
over the bridge and was on its way down an incline. 50 Finally, Beemer
stated that the second car had come over the bridge before “the second
man,” Arthur Wagner, fell from it. Asked whether “there was [any]
room for that second man to have stayed on [the] track [running over
the bridge] when a car passed over it,” Beemer replied, “No, there was
no room for him to stay there.” 51 Thus, Beemer was “willing to swear
that [the second] car passed over the bridge before [the] man fell
down.” 52
No other witnesses testified about the actions of Arthur
Wagner in walking up the trestle onto the bridge in search of his
cousin. One witness appeared to corroborate Beemer’s having come
out of the car barn with a lantern, having walked in the direction of the
trestle, where a second car was approaching, and having “flag[ged] the
other trolley coming.” 53 After doing so, the witness testified that
Beemer “proceeded on and under the trestle,” where the witness lost
sight of him. 54 Earl Roy, the motorman of the car from which Herbert
Wagner had fallen, corroborated that Beemer had arrived underneath
the trestle shortly after Roy and others had found Herbert Wagner’s
body, and that Beemer had then gone to the car barn to use the
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223-24.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 224-25.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 225.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 226.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 226-27.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 210, 212.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 213.
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telephone. 55 Since Beemer–and the motorman Roy as well– 56 denied
having ever said “Show me where he fell” to anyone, there was no
apparent explanation for why Arthur Wagner would have gone up the
trestle onto the bridge in search of his cousin, rather than underneath
the trestle with the others involved in the search. Edward Franchot,
representing the International Railway Company, noted on more than
one occasion, as the case passed from the trial court to the Appellate
Division and then to the Court of Appeals, that Arthur Wagner had
been drinking before boarding the trolley car at the Edgewater stop,
and speculated that perhaps Arthur had gone up the trestle because his
judgment was impaired from being intoxicated. 57
The credibility of Beemer’s and Arthur Wagner’s accounts
would end up being crucial to the outcome of the trial. It was the
central issue posed by Judge Charles B. Wheeler’s instruction to the
jury, subsequently to be discussed. But there was additional evidence
presented at the trial about Leo Beemer’s actions, from witnesses who
claimed that, in the period between the accident and the trial, Beemer
himself had given a different account of what he did at the
commencement of the search. Since the jury, in accepting Beemer’s
testimony rather than Arthur Wagner’s, must have disregarded this
evidence regarding Beemer’s prior inconsistent account, it seems
worthwhile to review it in some detail.
Beemer was no longer a conductor for the International
Railway Company at the time of the trial, which took place in April
and May, 1918 (the accident had occurred in August, 1916). He was
working for the Beaver Board Company in Buffalo, and had been
doing so for five months. 58 While employed at the Beaver Board
Company he was interviewed on March 22, 1918, by a Mr. Flynn, a
partner of Wagner’s counsel Hamilton Ward. Also present at the
interview was Carl J. Sturgis, the secretary to W.F. MacGlashan, the
president of the company. In Ward’s cross-examination of Beemer in
the Wagner trial, the following colloquy took place:
Q. Mr. Flynn, my partner, came out and called on you
at your place of employment, didn’t he?
55

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 180.
Roy was asked “after you got off the car and were on the ground, did you say to any man,
‘Where? You show me where he fell?’ and answered “No.” Record on Appeal, supra note 11,
at 181.
57 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53-54.
58 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 216.
56
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you have that conversation?
A. In the office.
Q. Do you know Mr. Sturgis, the Secretary to the
President?
A. I don’t know him.
Q. Was he there when you had your talk with Mr.
Flynn?
A. I couldn’t say whether he was or not.
Q. Did you say to Mr. Flynn . . . that you asked the
brother of the man who fell to come along with you?
Did you tell Mr. Flynn that in Mr. Sturgis’s presence?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. And did you tell them that when you and the brother
got up on the trestle you couldn’t see anybody around,
and you started to go back, and the brother of the man
who fell through the trestle said he was going back
again? Did you tell Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis that?
A. No, I didn’t tell them that.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis on the 22nd
of March, at the place of your employment, that you
went up on the trestle with the man that you thought
was the brother of the injured person, and that you
didn’t see anything and came back?
A. No, I didn’t tell him that at all.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/8

12

Abraham and White: Recovering Wagner

2018

RECOVERING WAGNER

33

Q. Did you mention anything about this man going with
you to Mr. Flynn or Mr. Sturgis?
A. The gentleman I was talking with, I don’t know what
his name was, I told him I went up to the trestle there
when I flagged this other car coming down.
Q. Did you tell him anything about going up with this
man that you thought was the brother of the injured
man?
A. I just don’t remember what I told him. 59
After this exchange and the conclusion of Beemer’s testimony,
Ward called Carl Sturgis as a witness (apparently in rebuttal), and the
following exchange took place:
Q. Were you there on the 22nd day of March, last, when
Mr. Flynn, my partner, came out there to interview this
conductor?
A. I was.
Q. And were you present at the conversation between
Mr. Flynn and Mr. Beemer?
A. I was.
Q. Did Mr. Beemer say to Mr. Flynn this or this in
substance: That after the car stopped he asked some
man there to come along with him, and that they went
upon the trestle?
A. Yes, he made the suggestion and they went back on
the trestle.
Q. And did he say this to Mr. Flynn, or this in substance:
That when he and the man got back on the trestle they
59

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 227-29.
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looked around and could not see anybody and he started
to go back?
A. Yes. 60
Sturgis was then cross-examined by Edward Franchot, who
unsuccessfully attempted to demonstrate that Sturgis had been coached
by Flynn or Ward about the substance of Flynn’s interview with Ward
before his testimony, and that he may have seen a memorandum from
Flynn to Ward summarizing the conversation Flynn had had with
Beemer. 61 Franchot was able to elicit two concessions from Sturgis,
however, that could have called the credibility of Sturgis’s testimony
into question. Sturgis admitted that after witnessing Flynn’s interview
with Beemer, Sturgis expected to be called as a witness; and Sturgis
acknowledged that, although he was a stenographer, he had taken no
notes of the interview of Beemer. 62
Nonetheless, on its face, the direct testimony of Sturgis could
have supported an inference that either Beemer’s memory was faulty
or that the parts of his trial testimony that conflicted with Arthur
Wagner’s account were false. Sturgis was an employee of the same
company that employed Beemer, had never met Flynn before the
interview, and had only appeared in court because Hamilton Ward’s
firm had subpoenaed him as a witness. 63 Yet in his testimony, Sturgis
promptly agreed that Beemer had told Flynn, in substance, that he had
asked “some man” to go upon the trestle with him in search of Herbert
Wagner, and that when Beemer had not found anyone, Beemer had
“gone back” toward the car from which Herbert Wagner had fallen. 64
Beemer had already testified, in recounting his activities after
he rang the bell for the motorman to stop the car, that immediately after
telling the motorman that someone had fallen off, he had gone in search
of a lantern. Robert Hogg, after noting that he had seen Beemer with
a lantern signaling the car, had also stated, on cross-examination, that
it might have been as many as five minutes between the time he first
saw Beemer with a lantern and the time the car stopped. So Beemer
might have had time to meet Arthur Wagner, ask him to show him
60
61
62
63
64
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where the man might have fallen, started along with Wagner up the
trestle to the bridge, shining his lantern, and when seeing nothing,
abruptly turned around, depriving Wagner of light.
More than one witness who was present when Herbert and
Arthur Wagner’s bodies were found lying under the trestle stated that
it was a very short interval of time between the discovery of Herbert’s
body and the subsequent discovery of Arthur’s. 65 But one witness
speculated that it may have taken as many as fifteen minutes for the
search party, once having located Herbert’s body, to have gotten back
from that spot to the car. 66 Another witness, speaking of the journey
from the car to where Herbert was found, said “there was some
difficulty getting there. . . . [T]here is underbrush and burdocks, . . .
and a good many things in the dark, a man has to go slow.” 67 It was
apparent that by the time both bodies were located, the second car had
descended the trestle and was stopped behind the first car, because
once both men were found, Herbert was carried to the second car and
Arthur to the first. 68 So Beemer, after concluding that a search on the
bridge would be futile, could have then headed back toward the car,
noticed the arrival of a second car, and stopped to signal that car in an
interval when Arthur was on the bridge without any light.
Two other features of Beemer’s testimony about his
conversation with Flynn and Sturgis could have undermined his
credibility generally. One is that he said “I don’t know” Sturgis, and
he couldn’t say whether Sturgis was “there or not” when he talked to
Flynn. Given that Sturgis was the general secretary of the president of
a company for which Beemer had worked for five months, and that
Beemer surely recognized the significance of an interview with a
lawyer about a case in which he was going to be called as a witness,
both statements seem evasive. The other is that on cross-examination,
Ward established that two or three weeks after his interview with
Sturgis, Beemer met with Edward Franchot and an associate, who paid
him for his time in the interview, and that Franchot had showed him a
statement that Beemer had made “right after the accident.” Ward and
Beemer then had the following exchange:
65 George W. Rappentine, who was one of the searchers who initially found Herbert’s body,
stated that it was “a minute or two” after he discovered the body that “somebody said, ‘Here
is another one.’” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 70.
66 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 94.
67 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 172.
68 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 73.
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Q. And then did you make up your mind that perhaps
you had been mistaken in what you said to Mr. Flynn
and Mr. Sturgis?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Franchot and [his associate] what
you had said to Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis?
A. I did.
Q. You didn’t tell them anything about your going up
on the trestle, did you?
A. Why, no, I didn’t tell them I went up on it because I
didn’t go up there.
Q. You didn’t. Did you tell them that you were asked
this question?
A. I forget whether I did or not. 69
In light of all the other issues raised by the events that produced
Wagner v. International Railway—whether the car was going at an
excessive rate of speed around the curve just before Herbert was
thrown off; whether the doors shutting off the back end of the car from
the outside should have been closed; whether the car should not have
started up an incline when passengers were still standing on its back
platform, some of them partly on its outside steps; whether the
conductor had taken sufficient steps to move the passengers standing
on the platform into the interior of the car, where there apparently was
room—why was so much attention paid to what Arthur Wagner and
Leo Beemer had done, or not done, after Herbert was thrown off the
train? That answer is that Edward Franchot had sensed that if he could
persuade the trial judge that the sole basis of the International
Railway’s negligence toward Arthur had to be found in the conduct of
Beemer after Herbert had fallen off the train and a search for him had
begun, anything that had happened before that, whether it was
69
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https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/8

16

Abraham and White: Recovering Wagner

2018

RECOVERING WAGNER

37

evidence of the line’s negligence toward Herbert or not, was irrelevant
to Arthur’s case. Franchot’s strategy was to focus on Arthur’s conduct
after his cousin disappeared, in order to show that no trolley car
employee had been negligent toward him and that he had arguably
been contributorily negligent, a complete bar to plaintiffs in negligence
suits in New York at the time. Having shown that, Franchot would
then rely on what was in effect a “proximate cause” argument: that
even if the International Railway had been negligent toward Herbert,
this was not negligence to Arthur; proof of separate acts of negligence
were needed.
After both parties rested and the jury was excused, both Ward
and Franchot made several motions to Judge Wheeler in connection
with his forthcoming instruction to the jury. 70 Wheeler subsequently
gave an instruction to the jury that completely accepted Franchot’s
arguments in those motions, with the result that the irreconcilability of
Arthur Wagner’s and Beemer’s testimony became the central focus of
the jury’s deliberations. Wheeler instructed the jury as follows:
In light of the view of the case which the court takes of
each of the facts and of the law I charge you that if there
was any negligence on the part of the [International]
Railway Company in overcrowding the car without
providing the passengers with seats, or if there was
negligence in the operation of the car around these
curves which caused injury to the cousin of the plaintiff,
. . . in as much as the car afterward crossed the trestle
and reached a place of safety and without injuring
the plaintiff in this action in any way, that . . . if such
negligence existed on the part of the company, such
negligence is not available to the plaintiff in this action
as the basis of any recovery; that he must base his right
to recover upon what transpired after the car in question
had crossed the trestle and reached the ground. . . . 71
Now, then, I charge you if without any invitation or any
request on the part of the defendant’s conductor . . . if
the plaintiff went upon this trestle, that is and of itself
more or less dangerous under the conditions of darkness
70
71

Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 255-73.
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 275.
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. . . if he, of his own motion and at his own suggestion
. . . went there, and . . . fell from the trestle, then
there can be no recovery in this action. . . . If, on the
other hand, he went up there at the request of the
conductor of the car . . . the conductor was . . . bound to
exercise reasonable care under those circumstances for
the safety of the man who went up there. . . . I am going
to leave it to you to determine, first, whether as a matter
of fact he went there at the request of the conductor,
and, second, if he did . . . whether the conductor in fact
left him in the darkness, without warning of [the
conductor’s] going, and whether such acts constituted
negligence on the part of the conductor, whose
negligence would be imputed to the railroad company
itself. You will remember, though, that the conductor
denies that he asked [the plaintiff] to point out
where the accident happened. . . . These things present
questions of fact for you to determine in the first
instance whether was matter of fact the plaintiff’s
version is correct or the defendant’s version is
correct. . . . If [the plaintiff] did not . . . [go]on top of
this trestle to point out the place of the accident at the
request of the conductor . . . there can be no recovery in
this action. 72
Wheeler’s instruction precluded Arthur Wagner from recovering from
the railroad by virtue of its negligence to Herbert Wagner. In
Wheeler’s view, although he did not express it in the language of
proximate causation, once the car from which Herbert had fallen
“reached a place of a safety without injuring [Arthur] in any way,” a
chain of events, the events that began with the successive actions of
the railway in creating a risk that Herbert might fall from the car, had
become complete. 73 A new chain had begun, if at all, in Wheeler’s
view, only when Beemer allegedly invited Arthur to accompany him
on a potentially dangerous search for his cousin. The railroad’s
negligence did not cause that search in itself, Wheeler believed, and
therefore the railroad could not be liable to Arthur Wagner unless it
had been negligent after the trolley car had stopped. That is, the
72
73
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railroad could be liable to Arthur only if Beemer, after providing
Arthur with light in a dangerous place in the darkness, had suddenly,
without warning, abandoned their joint search and deprived Arthur of
light.
Edward Franchot had outmaneuvered Hamilton Ward.
Franchot had produced several witnesses who testified that after
Herbert fell off the car, all the persons involved in the search for him,
save Arthur, had gone under the trestle, rather than back up it toward
the bridge, in their efforts to locate Herbert. Franchot had also
produced at least one witness who claimed to have seen Leo Beemer
emerge from a car barn with a lantern, head in the direction of the
trestle, flag down an oncoming car, and then head underneath the
trestle. 74 Cumulatively, that testimony served to isolate Arthur’s
search for his cousin on the trestle and bridge, suggesting that this
search may have been foolish, and to confirm conductor Beemer’s
claim that he had never accompanied Arthur up the trestle with a
lantern, or indeed had any contact with him after Herbert was thrown
off. The image conveyed by those witnesses was that of Arthur
Wagner going off on an inexplicable wild goose chase in search of his
cousin, while all the other members of the search party, including
Beemer, went to the logical place to search.
Consequently, even if Judge Wheeler had then instructed the
jury that any negligence on the part of the railway was a “proximate
cause” not only of risks to Herbert but also of risks to Arthur in his
capacity of a rescuer, the jury would have had to find that Arthur was
not contributorily negligent in going up the trestle to the bridge in the
dark. The only evidence that Arthur had been invited to go up the
trestle, and then deprived of light, came from Arthur’s own
testimony. 75 No one had seen Beemer on the bridge, or in the company
of Arthur at any time. If Arthur had not been invited to go onto the
bridge, he had gone there in the darkness, not knowing what conditions
he might encounter. As Ward put in his exchange in connection with
motions, “I haven’t the slightest doubt [that] any intelligent man would
know it was a dangerous place.” 76 In short, it was plain, after the
testimony of several witnesses, that a jury would need to believe
Arthur’s account, and disbelieve the accounts of all the other
witnesses, to find that Arthur had not negligently contributed to his fall
74
75
76
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from the bridge. Franchot had presented much stronger evidence of
the defendant’s version of the facts of Wagner.
But there was another way in which Arthur could have
prevailed that was foreclosed by Wheeler’s instructions to the jury.
Had the injury to Arthur been proximately caused by the railway’s
original negligence in permitting Herbert to fall off the car, Arthur
could have recovered unless he had been contributory negligent. But
Wheeler, with some help from Franchot, decided, as a matter of law,
that any possible negligence on the part of the railway towards Herbert
had no causal connection to Arthur’s injuries. Here are the relevant
passages in the exchanges between Wheeler, Franchot, and Ward when
the lawyers made motions for jury instructions after both sides had
rested:
Mr. Ward: Does your Honor feel that the original
negligence can not be charged to the defendant in this
case?
The Court: I am inclined to think so, on the whole case.
Mr. Ward: I am very much interested in that question,
and I am glad to have it come before your Honor.
The Court: It would be pressing the doctrine to an
extreme. 77
Moments later, Franchot pressed further:
Mr. Franchot: I would like to make a further motion. I
take it from what your Honor says that your Honor is
going to withdraw from the jury all of the evidence
with respect to the first accident: that is, any act of
omission or commission on the part of the motorman or
conductor up to the time when Herbert Wagner fell.
The Court: That is my present disposition.
Mr. Franchot: Withdraw that from the jury.

77
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The Court: Without saying so finally now, but that is
my disposition. That is what I think I shall do now . . .
I will make it in the morning, whatever it is, but I think
that you gentlemen, as I look at it now, unless I change
my mind, may be prepared to sum it up along the lines
I have laid down.
Mr. Franchot: And our summing up will be restricted to
merely that one point [that is, whether Beemer invited
Arthur to accompany him up the trestle and
subsequently withdrew the lantern].
The Court: If I still adhere to it it will be. Let me have
your briefs again, and I will look over your cases. 78
The next morning Wheeler announced the following ruling:
The Court: Mr. Stenographer, you may put upon the
minutes that . . . the court sends the case to the jury
upon the question whether the defendant’s conductor
asked the plaintiff to show him where the accident
happened and accompanied him up onto the trestle and
afterwards left him in the dark, whether those facts
constituted negligence on the part of the defendant or
not. 79
Franchot then pressed Wheeler about whether that charge
asked the jury to find whether in fact Beemer had done any of those
things, in addition to whether, if he did, they constituted negligence.
Wheeler then confirmed this, stating that he was “withdrawing all
other questions from the consideration of the jury, saving that of
damages, of course.” 80 Ward then asked for an exception to Wheeler’s
ruling that he would not submit to the jury “questions of negligence
arising out of the first accident,” and Wheeler granted it. 81 The
exchanges ended with Franchot confirming that “all consideration of
what happened before the car stopped” would be withdrawn from the
78
79
80
81
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jury, and that “we are bound by your Honor’s ruling that no negligence
can be found on that as a basis for liability in this case.” 82
Wheeler had said, in his instruction to the jury, that his
instruction was premised on the assumption that after Herbert was
thrown off, the car had “crossed the trestle and reached a place of
safety and without injuring the plaintiff in any way,” and that therefore,
Arthur “must base his right to recover upon what transpired after the
car in question had crossed the trestle and reached the ground.” 83
Wheeler did not offer any reason for why he attached significance to
the car’s having reached a “place of safety” without injuring Arthur,
but it appears he had seen that event as breaking some “chain” of
causation that began with the successive risks to which the railway’s
actions, while the car was moving, had exposed Herbert and other
passengers, and ended when the car stopped. A new “chain” thus
began when the railway may have exposed Herbert to risks that caused
his fall: that was the sole matter for the jury to consider.
It is interesting that Ward did not make more of an effort to
convince Wheeler that the risk to Arthur in going up the trestle could
be causally connected to the original negligence of the railway towards
Herbert. As noted, Wheeler had given only cryptic reasons for his
inclination to treat all of the alleged negligence toward Herbert as
irrelevant to Arthur’s potential recovery, stating that “[i]t would be
pressing the doctrine to an extreme.” 84 Perhaps Ward had concluded
that it would have been futile to continue efforts to convince Wheeler
that his analysis of proximate causation in the case was flawed, so he
resolved to make exceptions to Wheeler’s charge and preserve them
for appeal.
Given the testimony at trial and the way Wheeler framed the
Wagner case in his charge to the jury, it was almost inconceivable that
the jury would have found against the International Railway Company
on this basis, and it did not. The result was that on April 15, 1918,
Arthur Wagner was facing the prospect of living with serious and
permanent physical injuries–in his instruction to the jury Wheeler
described Arthur as “partially . . . paralyzed in his lower limbs” and
unable to work as an upholsterer. 85 Arthur would not have had any
medical insurance, and would have required constant medical attention
82
83
84
85
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to keep his feet from deteriorating further. Wheeler stated in his
instruction that Arthur’s life expectancy at the time of trial was
approximately 30 years, and that if the jury found that he could
recover, he would be entitled not only to lost wages and medical
expenses but to pain and suffering. 86 Given the nature and
consequences of Arthur’s injury, the sum of $50,000 in damages that
he requested, while a large amount for 1918, does not seem to be a
particularly inflated amount of compensation.
Ironically, Herbert Wagner, who had apparently been
thrown completely clear of the tracks, bridge, and trestle, landing
approximately 20 feet on the ground beneath the trestle and then rolling
onto the Erie tracks, was not seriously injured. Herbert testified that
he dislocated his shoulder when he was jostled off the car, but by the
spring of 1918, when he was deposed, he was healthy enough to have
been drafted into the U.S. Army, and was planning to join a corps of
engineers encamped at Ayre, Massachusetts. 87 Although Herbert had
emerged from his accident on August 20, 1916 comparatively
unscathed, Arthur had certainly not. He testified that after falling from
the bridge he had remained in the hospital for about nine months and a
half, being able to move around on crutches only in the middle of June,
1917; that at the time of trial he had “no strength” in his legs, could not
bend his ankles or move his feet, and could not walk without crutches;
and that he continued to have trouble with his bowels. 88 Arthur had
very little to lose by appealing to the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, and on May 11th of 1919, Hamilton Ward
filed an appeal, moving for a new trial.
The appeal was heard by the Appellate Division, a fivemember court at the time, on October 6, 1919. 89 A majority of the
Appellate Division denied Ward’s motion for a new trial, upheld the
jury verdict against Arthur, and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs in
both courts, an amount that came to $196.94. 90 One judge, John S.
Lambert, dissented, concluding both the question of Arthur’s
contributory negligence and that of any possible negligence on the part
86
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88 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 114-16, 118.
89 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 291-92. The Appellate Division judges who heard
the appeal were Frederick W. Kruse, the Presiding Justice, and Associate Justices Pascal C.J.
DeAngelis, Nathaniel Foote, Irving G. Hubbs, and John S. Lambert.
90 Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 189 A.D. 925, 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919), rev’d, 133 N.E. 437
(1921).
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of Beemer should have been submitted to the jury. 91 The Appellate
Division’s order was entered on October 20, 1919, and on March 9,
1920, Ward filed a further appeal from that judgment to the New York
Court of Appeals. 92
II.

THE GOVERNING CASE LAW

The trial in Wagner had been concerned with the facts, plus the
trial court’s (partially stated) conception of the applicable law, as
reflected in its instructions to the jury. Before the Court of Appeals,
however, only the applicable law could be the subject of contention.
To understand the parties’ strategies on appeal, as well as the
significance both of what Judge Cardozo did and did not say in his
opinion in Wagner, it is necessary to understand the state of the New
York case law on liability to rescuers at the time of the appeal.
In the decades before Wagner was decided, the courts of New
York had analyzed cases involving rescue in traditional proximate
cause terms. The question was whether the negligence of a defendant
that endangered one party was, or could be found to be, a proximate
cause of harm to the endangered party’s rescuer. The test for
proximate cause was stated in a standard phrase which identified one
act or event as a “proximate cause” of another event (such as an injury
suffered by a rescuer) if the latter followed from the former in a
“natural and probable” sequence.
One of the most prominent New York cases articulating the
“natural and probable sequence” test for proximate causation was
Laidlaw v. Sage. 93 At least part of the reason for Laidlaw’s
prominence, we think, is that the case, and the facts that generated it,
were notorious. On May 26, 1892, an individual named Norcross
had entered the lower Manhattan offices of Russell Sage, a wellknown industrialist, and handed Sage a note. 94 The note threatened to
detonate a bomb Norcross said he had in a carpet bag he was carrying,
if Sage did not give him $1.2 million. 95 Shortly thereafter, Norcross

91
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93 52 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1899). See the discussion of Laidlaw in WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
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did detonate the bomb. 96 Laidlaw, another individual in Sage’s offices
at the time, was injured by the explosion. Laidlaw sued Sage, alleging
that just before the explosion, Sage had placed Laidlaw between
himself and Norcross in order to protect himself. 97 The explosion
received widespread publicity. 98
Laidlaw’s suit against Sage was tried four times, and appealed
three times. 99 In the last appeal, one of the issues was whether, even
assuming that Sage had done what Laidlaw alleged, Sage’s actions
were a proximate cause of Laidlaw’s injuries.
The opinion in Laidlaw, which runs twenty pages in the fine
print of the Northeastern Reporter of the time, is not completely
coherent to the modern reader. At points, the opinion conflates cause
in fact with proximate cause, and the absence of causation with remote
cause. 100 But Laidlaw’s statement about proximate cause seems to
have become canonical: “The proximate cause of an event must be
understood to be that which in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produce that event, without which that
event would not have occurred.” 101 Ward’s Brief on Appeal to the
Court of Appeals quoted this passage from Laidlaw twice;102
Franchot’s brief cited Laidlaw three times. 103
Laidlaw was not a rescue case: its statement about the nature
of proximate cause was a predicate, or premise, for particular
arguments about rescue. However, a number of New York cases,
decided both before and after Laidlaw, had addressed rescue. Each
had held in favor of the plaintiff-rescuer. In addition, as would prove
important for purposes of the appellate arguments in Wagner, each
involved a rescue taking place virtually immediately after another
person was placed in danger.
Each of the New York rescue cases employed the chain of
causation reasoning that was reflected in Laidlaw’s reference to a
96
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98 See, e.g., A Crazy Man’s Lawful Act, N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 1891.
99 Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 682.
100 Id. at 688 (“A remote cause is one which is inconclusive in reasoning, because from it
no certain conclusion can be legitimately drawn. From the remote cause the effect does not
necessarily follow.”) (quoting an uncited anonymous article in the American Law Review).
101 Id. at 688 (quoting Sher. & R. Neg. § 26).
102 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 9, 16.
103 Brief of Respondent at 11-12, 14, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437
(N.Y. 1921) [hereinafter “Brief of Respondent”].
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“sequence, unbroken by any new cause.” 104 For example, in Gibney
v. State, 105 a father had attempted to rescue his son from a canal. The
defendant argued that its negligence toward the son could not be
regarded as the cause of the father’s death. The court rejected this
argument, on the ground that the “peril to which the father exposed
himself was the natural consequence of the situation” and that there
was therefore no “break in the chain of causes.” 106
Similarly, in Donnelly v. Piercy Contracting Co., 107 the
deceased was killed while trying to rescue a horse endangered by the
defendant’s negligence. Judge Andrews, previewing the approach he
would employ in his Palsgraf dissent ten years later, 108 and citing to
Laidlaw, said that the question was whether “the act of the defendant
gave rise to the stream of events which culminated in the accident,”
asked whether there was “an unbroken connection between the
wrongful act and injury,” and answered that there was “no such break
as a matter of law in the causal connection in the case before us.” 109
A handful of other New York cases took essentially the same
position. 110 Cases in other states had predominately reached the same
conclusion. Thus, although there was not a long line of New York
cases holding that negligence toward one party could generate liability
to that party’s rescuer when the rescuer acted instinctively and quickly,
there was no contrary New York authority, and other states had taken
the same position. There was not quite a firm “rescue doctrine,” but it
was certainly established that there could be liability in negligence to
rescuers.
It is important to note that this body of cases addressed the
plaintiff’s prima facie liability in rescue situations. There was a
separate question, addressed in a different line of authority, whether,
even if a defendant had prima facie liability to a rescuer, the defendant
could avoid liability under the defense of contributory negligence.
This line of cases stretched back at least to the 1871 case of Eckert v.
104
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109 Donnelly, 118 N.E. at 606.
110 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Erie R. Co., 139 A.D. 291, 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910); Waters v.
Taylor, 112 N.E. 727, 728 (N.Y. 1916) (dealing with the issue under workman’s
compensation).
105
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Long Island R.R. Co., 111 well-known and frequently cited at the time
of Wagner and today. Eckert held that the question of whether a
rescuer was contributorily negligent was typically for the jury, and that
errors in judgment made under conditions of emergency did not bar
recovery. 112 Eckert also involved a rescue that occurred virtually
immediately after the person being rescued had been placed in
danger. 113
III.

THE ARGUMENTS MADE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

At the Court of Appeals, Ward made the issue of proximate
causation the centerpiece of his argument. 114 By that point, Ward had
assembled a number of cases, including the New York cases we
discussed above, in which rescuers had recovered from defendants
who had placed others in danger. Of the 33 pages in his brief, Ward
devoted approximately 15 of them to such cases, using them in support
of his eventual conclusion that “it was certainly not for the court to say
as a matter of law that Arthur Wagner[‘s] . . . attempt [to rescue
Herbert] did not result from the negligent act of the defendant in
injuring Herbert Wagner and placing him in peril.” 115
One of the main challenges for Ward was that, unlike past
cases, Arthur Wagner’s attempted rescue was not literally instinctive
and immediate. Arthur did not see Herbert fall and immediately act to
help him. Instead, he first had to wait for the trolley to move several
hundred feet and stop. 116 Then, under his account, he talked with the
conductor and made his way back toward the point where he thought
he might find Herbert. None of the rescue cases on which Ward relied
involved a delayed rescue of this sort, although none expressly limited
liability to situations involving immediate and instinctive rescues only.
Consequently, Ward did not have a precedent that settled the
question whether this kind of immediacy mattered, or instead was a
distinction without a difference. That is why he first argued, based on
Laidlaw, Donnelly, and other rescue cases, that the rescue had taken

111

43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
Id.
113 Id.
114 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. Both parties filed essentially identical briefs at
both appellate levels.
115 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22.
116 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4-5.
112
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place in unbroken sequence. 117 Then, relying on the literal language
of Laidlaw, he deemphasized the lack of immediacy of the rescue and
argued that, under the circumstances, Arthur’s attempted rescue of
Herbert was “instinctive, natural, and necessary.” 118
Ward focused on the nature of Arthur’s motivation rather than
the length of time he had to decide what to do. He noted that the cases
that had allowed rescuers to recover had drawn no distinction between
“instinctive” and “deliberate” rescue attempts: the sole criterion had
been whether, when an effort to “preserve human life” was being
attempted, the attempt had been made “under such circumstances as to
constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons.” 119 Ward
argued that it had been error for Wheeler to refuse to instruct the jury
to that effect, and that it had been error to instruct the jury that there
could be no recovery if Arthur had gone onto the trestle and bridge
without an invitation from the defendant. 120
Franchot, in contrast, made exactly the arguments that Ward
anticipated. He contended that actions by rescuers that were not
“instinctive” amounted to deliberate, voluntary assumption of the risk
in rescuing, and that injured rescuers who deliberated before
undertaking rescue efforts should therefore be barred from recovery.
He pointed out that Arthur had walked over 600 feet up the trestle to
the bridge, and “[d]uring every step of the way and every instant of the
time he had a chance to think.” 121
Franchot’s brief recognized that the proximate causation
argument was Ward’s strongest, and developed a two-prong strategy
to refute it. First, he argued that in every proximate cause case cited
by Ward in his brief, there were two elements lacking in Wagner: “an
actual impending peril to the life or limb of either the plaintiff himself
or some other person or persons,” and evidence that “[t]he plaintiff,
seeing the actual peril, acted instinctively and impulsively, or at least
in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.” 122 In Wagner,
117

Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 9-10.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 22.
119 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22, 28-29.
120 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 24, 28, 30, 32. Ward also argued that the court
should have allowed him to recall Arthur to establish that he believed Herbert was somewhere
on the trestle, and that there was no evidence that Arthur was intoxicated at any time on August
20, 1916, as Franchot had suggested. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 30, 32. Neither of
those arguments played any part in the Court of Appeals’ decision in Wagner.
121 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 25, 32.
122 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 25.
118
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Franchot maintained, “the peril to Herbert Wagner was over . . . .
There was nothing except [Arthur’s] conjecture or belief that could
have lead him up onto the trestle, a belief which nobody else present
entertained and which we contend it was entirely unreasonable and
improper for him to entertain.” 123
The second prong of Franchot’s proximate cause argument was
that Ward had confused proximate causation with contributory
negligence. In most of the “proximate cause” cases Ward had cited,
“the negligence of the defendant[‘s] [having] proximately caused the
accident was assumed . . . without consideration or discussion,” 124 and
the issue was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. In his
summary of the cases, Franchot claimed that
[I]t will be seen that the various cases cited by the
plaintiff . . . may be authority for relaxing the rule as to
contributory negligence in deference to the noble
instinct or impulse of human nature to render assistance
to others in peril, or in deference to the instinct of selfpreservation which leads a plaintiff to act sometimes
foolishly or recklessly under the stress of an immediate
emergency, but they have no authority on the question
of proximate cause which is now under consideration:
in each and every one of them, the relation of cause and
effect between the negligent act of the defendant and
the injury to the plaintiff was clear, natural, and
necessary under all the rules, and in fact the question of
proximate cause was hardly discussed. The decisions
can be supported upon the doctrine that impulsive,
instinctive, and, therefore, automatic human action
does not break the chain of cause and effect. . . . As
previously pointed out, the action of the plaintiff in this
case . . . was deliberative; he had time for reflection and
did reflect; during every instant of time while was
walking back from the car throughout the distance of
600 feet to the place where he fell, he had chance for
thought. 125

123
124
125

Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 27.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 29.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 31-32.
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This may have been true of some of the cases, but not the
important ones. For example, two of the central New York cases,
Gibney 126 and Donnelly, 127 expressly singled out proximate cause for
separate treatment.
Franchot further argued that under New York law, whether the
proximate cause requirement was satisfied was always a question of
law. 128 This also was not the case, although there was some language
in the case law supporting the proposition. Then, based on this
(dubious) proposition, Franchot contended that any negligence of the
defendant toward Herbert Wagner was not a proximate cause of the
injuries to Arthur Wagner, as a matter of law. 129 Franchot based this
last argument on two propositions he gleaned from Laidlaw: (1) there
was not an unbroken sequence between any negligence on the part of
the trolley car line toward Herbert and Arthur’s injury; and (2) because
no one but Arthur thought that Herbert’s body could be found on the
tracks rather than below, Arthur’s attempt at rescue was neither
“necessary” nor “natural.” 130
Point (2) was a clever and artful, though ultimately
unsuccessful, effort to avoid the Eckert line of cases. Franchot was
attempting to turn what the Court of Appeals might well decide should
be a question of fact -- whether Arthur had been contributorily
negligent in the manner in which he undertook the rescue -- into a
question of proximate cause, and then to have that question decided as
a matter of law in the defendant’s favor, thus preventing any remand
for a new trial.
After the briefs in Wagner were submitted, it was clear that
there were two central issues remaining in the case. One was whether
Wheeler’s ruling that none of the original acts of negligence of the
railway could be made a basis for recovery by Arthur Wagner was
correct. The other was whether, even if Beemer’s alleged conduct
toward Arthur had amounted to negligence which caused Arthur’s fall
and injury, Arthur could not recover, because his supposedly bizarre
search for Herbert on the tracks either negated proximate cause as a
126 33 N.E. at 142 (“It is contended by the attorney general that the negligence of the state
. . . cannot be regarded as the cause of the death of the father. . . . But . . . the peril to which
the father exposed himself was the natural consequence of the situation.”).
127 118 N.E. at 606 (“Nor do we think that the intervention of the deceased prevents the
original act of negligence being the proximate cause of the accident.”).
128 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 11.
129 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 11.
130 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 14.
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matter of law, or was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Both
issues turned on the treatment of injured rescuers at common law.
This was the posture in which Wagner v. International Railway
Co. was submitted to the Court of Appeals for decision.
IV.

THE OPINION IN WAGNER

Cardozo handed down the opinion in Wagner in 1921, when he
was in the seventh of his eighteen years (1914-32) on the New York
Court of Appeals. He had already written a book on judging – his
celebrated The Nature of the Judicial Process. 131 He had also written
a number of significant tort decisions: MacPherson v. Buick 132 five
years earlier, Adams v. Bullock 133 two years earlier, and Hynes v. New
York Central R.R. Co. 134 earlier that same year. He was, in short, a
seasoned and self-conscious appellate judge who was not new to
deciding tort cases. But he was a judge, not an academic, 135 and torts
cases were just one set of cases that appeared on the quite diverse
docket of the Court of Appeals. Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner should
be understood in this context. He was deciding the case, responding
to the arguments the parties had made to the Court, and explaining the
basis of his decision, as he sought to do in all his opinions. But one of
Cardozo’s instincts, as a judge, was to establish doctrinal propositions
that he hoped could give guidance across a range of cases. Wagner
would give him an opportunity to lay down such a proposition for cases
involving tort actions by rescuers.
A. Cardozo’s Approach
In his opinion, Cardozo first recited the facts in the passage that
we quoted at the outset of Part I. He then identified the assignment of
error on appeal. This was the passage in the trial court’s jury
instruction containing the “limitation” on the defendant’s liability to
131 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). Wagner was
decided on November 22, 1921. Consequently, the book certainly had already been written
and put to bed, and the odds are that it had already been published.
132 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
133 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
134 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921) (decided May 31).
135 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 133 (1990) (discussing the
reasons judicial opinions are not often regarded by academics as reflecting high-quality
scholarship).
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Arthur “unless” two conditions were satisfied: that Arthur had been
invited to attempt to rescue Herbert, and that the conductor (Beemer)
had accompanied him. As Cardozo put it, “Whether the limitation may
be upheld, is the question to be answered.” 136
This way of posing the issue was accurate, but it also contained
the implied (and accurate) suggestion that there was, in general,
liability to rescuers, and that something unusual might have occurred
in the case. Otherwise, the term “limitation” would not have been
completely accurate. If, as a general matter, there was no liability to
rescuers in cases where there was sufficient time for an invitation to
rescue to be issued, and for a prospective rescuer to deliberate on his
own about whether to attempt a rescue, a time interval’s being
“immediate,” or a rescuer’s reaction being “instinctive,” would have
been more accurately termed a “prerequisite” or “precondition” to
liability, rather than a “limitation” on liability. From the outset, then,
Cardozo implied that the trial court may have been swimming against
the current by doing something unusual or special in imposing a
“limitation” on liability that commonly extended to rescuers.
The next sentence is the most famous in the opinion: “Danger
invites rescue.” 137 In many of his opinions, Cardozo moved abruptly
and without preliminaries from his statement of the facts to the legal
conclusion that resolved a case. Explanation of the basis for the legal
conclusion stated at the outset then followed. For example, in
Palsgraf, the first sentence after his statement of the facts was “The
conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in relation to the holder
of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing
far away.” 138 And in Adams v. Bullock, the first sentence after the
statement of facts was “We think the verdict cannot stand.” 139
But that is not what happened in Wagner. “Danger invites
rescue” may count as a legal conclusion today, but it was not yet a legal
conclusion when Cardozo wrote the phrase. Rather, Cardozo moved
abruptly and without preliminaries from a statement of the facts to
what, at that point, was an explanation. The next sentence confirms
this, for it was no more “legal” than the first: “The cry of distress is a
summons to relief.” 140 Rather, these two sentences were “taken over
136
137
138
139
140

Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
Id.
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 341.
Adams, 125 N.E. at 93.
Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
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from the facts of life,” as Cardozo would say in a later tort case, writing
for the U.S. Supreme Court. 141 He thus began, not with a rule or a
legal conclusion, but with facts of which he seemed almost to take
judicial notice. The major premise of his Wagner opinion came from
a sense of the way the world actually works rather than a doctrinal
proposition of tort law.
Reading those two sentences, Edward Franchot would already
have known that he had lost. Even before expressly addressing
Franchot’s proximate cause argument, Cardozo had dispensed with it.
But just to be clear, he then gave that argument the back of his hand,
moving from the facts of everyday life to the law:
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them
as normal. It places their effects within the range of the
natural and the probable. The wrong that imperils life is
a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his
rescuer. 142
There then followed, in the same paragraph, descriptions of and
citations to prior cases so holding, Gibney most prominently.
Notably, Cardozo never cited Laidlaw in Wagner. When he
chose to speak in doctrinal, rather than factual terms, he only gestured
obliquely in Laidlaw’s direction, using the phrase “natural and
probable,” but emphasizing the nature of the defendant’s wrong rather
than a causal connection: a “wrong to the imperiled victim . . . is a
wrong also to his rescuer.” 143
Cardozo’s omission of any citation to Laidlaw had to have been
a considered decision on his part. The explosion that gave rise to
Laidlaw took place in New York City when Cardozo was 22 years old,
and received widespread publicity: Sage’s prominence alone would
have ensured that it came to Cardozo’s attention. The multiple trials
of the resulting suit against Russell Sage occurred while Cardozo was
a young lawyer in New York. In their briefs, both Ward and Franchot
had cited Laidlaw multiple times.
In our view, the reason Cardozo did not cite Laidlaw is that he
wanted to avoid as much as possible the “chain of causation”
conception of proximate cause that Franchot had presented to the
141
142
143

Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
Id.
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court, that Ward had tried to sidestep, and that Laidlaw reflected. To
do this, he talked mainly about the rescue cases, and when it was
necessary to speak of what amounted to proximate cause, he
nonetheless did not use that term and did not talk about “chains” of
causation.
Rather, as Warren Seavey suggested long ago, Cardozo
focused in Wagner on the nature of risk. 144 The risk in question was
the risk to potential rescuers of persons endangered by a party’s
negligence. This concern with risk was also evident in MacPherson,
in which the risk he identified was to users of a product from negligent
manufacture of the product. In Palsgraf, Cardozo also spoke in the
language of risk. In that case, the concern was with the absence of any
apparent risk to a party who is not foreseeably endangered by an act
that is negligent to someone else.
It would be possible to describe Cardozo’s focus on risk in
Wagner as another way of discussing the duty of a negligent party to
rescuers of those whom the party has endangered. But it would be
anachronistic to do this: to see Cardozo as concerned, one way or the
other, with the nature or independent status of duty as an element of
the cause of action in Wagner would be to read something into the case
that is not there. 145 Cardozo’s opinion does not reflect any
preoccupation with, or even interest in, the duty concept. As an
abstract proposition, Cardozo’s identification and characterization of
the relevant risk in Wagner might be thought consistent with
recognizing duty as an independent element of a cause of action in tort,
but it would take a big leap to read such recognition into the Wagner
opinion itself. That today “rescue” cases are analyzed by some
commentators in terms of duty, breach, and causation, does not mean
that Cardozo did so.
144 Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 398-99
(1939). John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have contended that the concept of duty was
central to Cardozo’s earlier opinion in MacPherson. Whatever may have been the case in
MacPherson, the concept of duty is not present in his Wagner opinion. See John C. P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1823 nn.35556 (1998).
145 Beginning with his 1941 treatise on tort law, Prosser contended that duty was essentially
a conclusory and unnecessary category. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 180 (1941).
Goldberg and Zipursky have famously taken issue with him on this score, and less famously
with each of us. The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 144, at 1745-46 n.45 (White), 1770
(Abraham). But Prosser only began taking issue with the duty concept two and half decades
after MacPherson, and more than a decade after Palsgraf. Goldberg and Zipursky’s attack on
Prosser came more than five decades after that.
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For Cardozo, however, the risk at issue was definitely
relational. 146 The whole point of the phrase “Danger invites rescue”
was that risking harm to a potential victim also risked harming a
potential rescuer. Approaching risk in this way contrasted with the
“chain of causation” conception in Laidlaw, and with Franchot’s use
of that conception in arguing the defendant’s case. And as we will
suggest below, this approach also foreshadowed Cardozo’s much more
extensive analysis of risk in Palsgraf.
After stating and supporting the major premise of the opinion,
that danger invites rescue, Cardozo turned directly to Franchot’s
arguments. As to the asserted requirement that a rescue be instinctive,
he was willing to assume that the peril to the first victim and rescue
“must in substance be one transaction . . . that there must be unbroken
continuity between the commission of the wrong and the effort to
avert its consequences.” 147 But instinctiveness was not required.
“Continuity in such circumstances is not broken by the exercise of
volition.” 148 Rather, it was “enough that the act, whether impulsive or
deliberate, is the child of the occasion.” 149 These sentences were the
full extent of Cardozo’s engagement with Franchot’s lengthy attempts
at trial to establish the factual predicate for his proximate cause
position and with his extensive arguments on appeal regarding that
position, phrased in terms of what was not “natural” or “necessary.”
In fact, Franchot’s argument that it was preposterous for Arthur
to search for Herbert on the tracks rather than below -- and that, as a
consequence, the causal link between the defendant’s negligence in
causing Herbert’s fall and Arthur’s injury had been broken -apparently did not merit a direct response. Cardozo refused even to
engage with this argument in the language of proximate cause. For
Cardozo, the substance of this contention went to Arthur’s possible
contributory negligence, not to the defendant’s negligence or
proximate cause.
On that issue, Franchot had argued that Arthur was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in undertaking a rescue of
his cousin on the trestle and bridge tracks rather than below the trestle.
Cardozo also dismissed that argument: “We think the quality of
146

See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 144, at 1744 (arguing that duty is a relational
concept).
147 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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[Arthur’s] acts in the situation that confronted him was to be
determined by the jury.” 150 Arthur had a basis for thinking that
Herbert’s body might not actually have fallen to the ground below, and
the decision he made was in the circumstance of an emergency: “The
plaintiff had to choose at once, in agitation and with imperfect
knowledge.” 151
In conclusion, therefore, the lower courts were reversed:
“Whether Herbert Wagner’s fall was due to the defendant’s
negligence, and whether plaintiff, in going to the rescue, as he did, was
foolhardy or reasonable in light of the emergency confronting him,
were questions for the jury.” 152 What was not a question for the jury,
however, was whether the defendant’s negligence as to Herbert was
also negligence as to his rescuer, Arthur. It was, as a matter of law.
Was Wagner a case whose peculiar facts revealed that a new
approach to questions of proximate causation was required, one that
side-stepped inquiries into “chains” of causation and their breakage, or
“superceding” causes, for inquiries about the creation of risks through
negligence and their scope? Or was it a case that sought to carve out
an enduring exception, for human rescuers of other humans in peril, to
the principle that unreasonable exposure to risks, whether voluntary or
not, barred injured persons from recovering against those who had
negligently created the risks?
Actually, it was both: a case in which Cardozo signaled that
where rescuer plaintiffs were concerned, traditional limitations on
recovery in tort law based on proximate causation or on contributory
negligence were, in many cases, going to be ignored. After Wagner,
“danger invites rescue” was not only a fact of everyday life, the
premise of Cardozo’s approach, but also a legal principle.
B. Foreshadowing Palsgraf
We think that the decision in Wagner contains virtually
everything necessary to its more celebrated offspring, Palsgraf. The
latter case is rightly considered to be Cardozo’s foremost statement on
the nature and reach of liability for negligence. But seven years before
Palsgraf, Wagner had already done essentially everything that
Palsgraf would later do and be remembered for.
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
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First, Wagner explained, albeit in more summary fashion, the
centrality of risk-analysis to questions involving what others had
analyzed in terms of proximate cause. The risk to a victim was also a
risk to his or her rescuer. Cardozo might instead have said, “risking
harm to a victim is a proximate cause of harm to his or her rescuer, as
a matter of law.” And he might have said, “a party with a duty to
exercise reasonable care toward someone also has a duty to his
rescuer.” But Cardozo did not say either of these things. He spoke in
terms of risk and wrong. He spoke about the nature of the defendant’s
negligence. That is precisely what he would later do in Palsgraf.
As he memorably said there, “The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed. . . .” 153 Rescue is a risk “reasonably to
be perceived” when a potential victim is endangered: “Danger invites
rescue.” Danger to Mrs. Palsgraf, in contrast, was not reasonably to
be perceived.
Second, Wagner rejected the causal-chain analysis that Judge
Andrews would later employ in his Palsgraf dissent. The defendant in
Wagner argued, among other things, that Arthur Wagner’s considered
decision to search for Herbert on the tracks, rather than below, broke
the chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant in
causing Herbert to fall and Arthur’s own rescue-related injury.
Cardozo would have none of this. “Danger invites rescue” was really
the only proposition he needed, though he did assume for purposes of
argument that there might not be liability when there was not
“unbroken” continuity between the first wrong and a rescue. 154
Finally, Wagner applied the distinction between a question of
law and a question of fact in this area. “Danger invites rescue” is a
rule of law at a high level of generality. In stating this rule, Wagner
constitutes more than a mere holding about what questions were and
were not for the jury under the facts of that case. Much like the thinskull rule, Wagner articulated a rule that a particular risk -- being
injured in a rescue of a party negligently endangered -- is automatically
associated with negligence. Similarly, Palsgraf articulates a rule about
a particular risk -- conversely, a particular risk that is automatically not
associated with negligence -- the risk of injuring an unforeseeable
party in the course of endangering a foreseeable party. But this
approach to classifying, as a matter of law, risks that are or are not

153
154

Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 344.
Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
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associated with negligence did not originate in Palsgraf; it had already
been adopted in Wagner. In short, in a very real sense it is Wagner,
not Palsgraf, that is Cardozo’s seminal decision in this area of tort law.
C. Wagner’s Subsequent History
Wagner quickly became a staple principal case in the torts
casebooks. 155 The first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS recognized its
holding, though limiting it to “normal” efforts to rescue. 156 The
case remains a standard in contemporary casebooks. 157 The third
Restatement devotes a separate section to “rescue,” eliminating the
“normal efforts” qualification of its predecessors. 158 However, most
treatments of rescue, then and now, continue to deal with the subject
under the rubric of causation, typically providing or explaining why a
rescue ordinarily is not a superseding cause that precludes imposition
of liability on the party that negligently endangered the victim being
rescued. 159 The chain-of-causation approach apparently cannot be
banished from thinking about liability to rescuers, although the effect
of Wagner on that approach is to reject outright the argument that a
decision to rescue a negligently endangered person can break some
chain of causation. The chain-of-causation reasoning that Cardozo
sought to avoid in Wagner keeps rearing its arguably-ugly head.
CONCLUSION
Wagner v. International Railway has disappeared from
prominent coverage in contemporary torts casebooks, although
Palsgraf remains highlighted. We believe that Wagner should be
given prominent treatment, and paired with Palsgraf. A comparison
of the two cases could illustrate several doctrinal and jurisprudential
propositions that might give current students some entry points into the
155

See, e.g., FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (2d ed. 1925); LEON
GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES 840 (1931); WILLIAM M. HEPBURN &
ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 586 (2d ed. 1935); HARRY
SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 326 (1942);
and EDWARD S. THURSTON & WARREN A. SEAVEY, CASES ON TORTS 363 (1942).
156 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 445 (Am. Law Inst. 1934). By this it apparently meant, not
extraordinary. See id. at § 443.
157 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 417 (11th ed. 2016).
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, at § 32.
159 See sources cited supra notes 155 and 157.
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typically bedeviling issue of proximate causation and its relationship
to duty, negligence, and contributory negligence.
First, the facts of Wagner, when compared with those of
Palsgraf, readily demonstrate the arbitrariness of analyses of
“proximate” causation that emphasize broken or unbroken “chains” of
causation, or “superceding” or “intervening” causes. In both Wagner
and Palsgraf, there was no doubt that the negligence of the
defendant—the series of careless actions on the part of employees of
the trolley car line that resulted in Herbert Wagner’s falling from the
car, or the conduct of the Long Island Railroad’s guard in dislodging a
package when he helped passengers board a moving train—was a
factual cause of the injuries to Arthur Wagner and Helen Palsgraf.
Herbert fell off the car because of the negligence of Beemer and
possibly Roy, and Arthur attempted to rescue Herbert because Herbert
was obviously in peril after falling off. Helen Palsgraf was injured
because the dislodged package, which contained fireworks, exploded
when it hit the ground, and the subsequent explosion caused a heavy
scale on an adjacent railroad platform to topple, coming into contact
with Palsgraf, who was standing near the scale with her daughters
while preparing to board another train.
A “chain” of factual causation between a defendant’s
negligence and a plaintiff’s injury was thus intact in both cases. “But
for” the negligence of Beemer and possibly Roy in Wagner, and the
guard in Palsgraf, the plaintiffs in those cases would not have been
injured. To claim otherwise—to assert that the negligent acts of the
trolley car employees had somehow “come to rest” when Roy brought
the car to a stop at the foot of the trestle, or that the explosion of the
fireworks or the toppling of the scale had somehow “intervened” to
eliminate any possible liability on the part of the guard toward
Palsgraf, was simply to attach a label to a normative judgment.
Whether a cause was “superceding,” or whether an action “broke a
chain” of causation, in those circumstances, depended only on a court’s
identifying it as such.
Cardozo implicitly recognized the arbitrariness of analyses that
emphasized “chains” of causation, or “superceding” causes, in both
Wagner and Palsgraf. He eschewed both analyses by stressing that
where the negligence of a defendant toward a foreseeable victim ended
up injuring another victim, the proper technique for determining
whether liability should extend to the other victim was not to posit a
prospective chain of causation from the defendant to the injured party
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and then ask whether it had been “broken” or “superceded” by some
other act. The proper technique was to ask whether the defendant’s
negligent conduct could fairly be described as posing a risk to the party
who ended up being injured. In Wagner, Cardozo answered “yes” to
that question by announcing that “danger invites rescue,” and thus
prospective rescuers of persons endangered by the conduct of
negligent defendants were within the category of victims exposed to
risks by that conduct. In Palsgraf, he answered “no” to the same
question, stating that Palsgraf, standing far from the site where a guard
had caused a package with no notice that it contained fireworks to fall
to the ground, could not fairly be said to be within the class of persons
put at risk by the dislodging of the package.
In Palsgraf, Cardozo put his “risk” analysis in terms of duty
and foreseeability: “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived” defined the
duty of the guard. It was “risk to another or to others within the range
of apprehension,” and Helen Palsgraf, “standing far away” from the
site where the guard dislodged the package, was outside that range. In
Wagner, his risk analysis was more categorical: he simply stated that
as a matter of law, prospective rescuers of persons endangered by
negligent defendants were also placed at risk by that conduct. Had
Cardozo employed his Palsgraf language in Wagner, he would have
said that the risk of harm to a rescuer was “reasonably to be perceived”
by a party whose negligence placed someone in peril, and thus the
negligent party owed a duty not to expose the rescuer to injury.
Cardozo also said in Palsgraf that “the law of causation,
remote or proximate” was “foreign to the case.” He did not say that in
Wagner, but neither did he use the language of proximate causation to
capture the relationship between the negligent trolley car line and the
rescuer, Arthur Wagner. Nor did he say, explicitly, that the
International Railway company owed a duty of care toward rescuers of
persons endangered by the negligent conduct of its employees. Nor,
for that matter, did he used the language of foreseeability in defining
the relationship between the negligent trolley line and Arthur. But it
was plain that his “danger invites rescue” proposition meant that
negligence which created a risk to a passenger on a trolley car line also
created a risk to that passenger’s rescuer. It was also plain, after
Palsgraf, that the reason that Arthur Wagner might have expected to
recover for his injuries after the Court of Appeals decision, but Helen
Palsgraf could not, was that a risk to Arthur stemming from the
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defendant’s negligent conduct was “reasonably to be perceived,” but
that a risk to Helen Palsgraf was not.
We thus think that Wagner and Palsgraf have more in common
than commentators may have suspected, and that taken together they
offer a way of making sense of a good many “proximate cause” cases.
The defining feature of such cases, and the principal reason they can
be confounding, is that they combine a factual connection between a
defendant’s conduct and injury to a plaintiff with the unexpectedness
of that injury, either in its type, its extent, its manner, or in the class of
injured victim. Risks that might reasonably be thought to arise from
the defendant’s conduct do not result in the injuries being complained
of; instead other risks eventuate in those injuries. In Wagner, risks
resulting from failing to close a door on a trolley, failing to move
passengers away from an exposed platform on that trolley, and the
operation of the trolley at excess speed around a curve might
reasonably have resulted in a passenger on that platform being thrown
off, and that risk occurred. But it was not Herbert Wagner who ended
up being seriously injured; it was his cousin, Arthur, in the role of
Herbert’s rescuer. And in Palsgraf, it was not an injury to the package
or its contents that produced a negligence suit against the Long Island
Railroad, but physical and emotional injuries to Helen Palsgraf from
coming into contact with the scale.
Both cases thus produced injuries that were factually connected
to the negligent conduct of the defendant, but were suffered by
unexpected classes of persons: rescuers and bystanders. Both were
classic “proximate cause” cases, but deciding the cases by declaring
one injury to be a “proximate” and the other a “remote” cause of the
defendant’s negligence was as arbitrary as declaring a “chain” of
causation to remain intact in one case and to have been broken in
another. In fact, the cases were both about small risks that were
factually connected to the large risk that made the defendant negligent.
Cardozo decreed in Wagner that the small risk of injury to a rescuer
was sufficiently connected to the large risk of injury to a passenger to
send the question of the trolley line’s negligence to the jury. He
decreed in Palsgraf that the small risk of injury to Palsgraf from
coming into contact with toppling scales was insufficiently connected
to the large risk of injury to the package or its contents to permit
recovery. He claimed that Palsgraf was not a proximate cause case,
and he did not use the language of proximate causation in Wagner. But
both cases were proximate cause cases, and both were about the
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connection between the large risks that make conduct negligent and
the seemingly smaller risk that ends up producing associated injury.
When paired with Palsgraf, Wagner furnishes a vivid illustration of
two cases in which Cardozo employed risk analysis to distinguish one
category of proximate cause cases from another. For all its prescience,
Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner concealed that fact as much as it revealed
it.
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